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Professor Lynch provides a useful evaluation of arguments trying to reconcile animal
pain with the traditional conception of God. Assuming that those who believe in a
perfectly good and all powerful deity must explain why God would construct the universe
so as to allow animal pain not caused by humans, Lynch discusses four arguments in
defense of God: the corrupted creation thesis; the animals are non-conscious thesis; the
animal pain isn’t as bad as it seems thesis; and the God just doesn’t care thesis.
Lynch supplies reasons to find them wanting. He argues, first, that theists should not
blame animal suffering on fallen angels because evolution provides a better explanation
of predation and God could prevent animal suffering even though creation is corrupted.
He argues, second, that theists should not endorse the idea that animal pain is illusory,
Peter Harrison’s views notwithstanding. We are justified in believing that animals feel
pain because we see animals writhing in pain; we know that their neurophysiological
structures are incredibly similar to ours; and we recognize that we evolved these
structures in common with animals. Responsible theists should not try to defend God by
invoking the Devil or dismissing animals.
Third, argues Lynch, theists should not try to deflate animal pain. Even if animal pain
states are less complex than human pain states, this supposed fact should not lead us to
underestimate the degree to which animal pains hurt. Fourth, Lynch argues that even
though God is incorporeal, God can still sympathize with animal suffering because of
God’s omniscience.
While conceding that he has not refuted traditional theistic belief, Lynch suggests that the
burden of proof is on the theist, and I agree. Theists need to offer an explanation of the
problem that does not exempt God from responsibility for animal pain, and that neither
denies nor trivializes animal suffering. I am not certain that I have such an argument to
defend the God of traditional monotheism, but I would like to suggest some lines for
further inquiry.
Lynch claims that “an omnipotent deity presumably could have prevented animal
suffering,” and prima facie it seems possible for God to have made things much better
than they are for animals. The world apparently could have been one in which all events,
people and animals exist just as they do in our world, except that all events of animal pain
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and suffering were absent. Lions could have been herbivores; domesticated cats could
have been so disposed that they would never torture backyard bunnies; deer could have
been so hardwired that they would always successfully avoid onrushing cars. The idea
seems plausible enough. Animals are good, but suffering is bad; God wants to create the
best world God can, and in the best world God can create there is a favorable balance of
good over evil. So God creates animals, but only those that cannot suffer.
I am not convinced that such a world is possible. First, there is the question of whether it
makes sense to speak of herbivorous lions and predators that do not eat meat. But one can
easily imagine this objection being answered by supposing that the world contains no
predators at all, and no animal suffering resulting from animal to animal aggression. Even
in a world in which animals never caused each other pain there would still be plenty of
animal pain: pain caused by natural evils such as plagues and earthquakes. So take out of
the world all predators and all animal pain caused by other animals; you still will not
have eliminated all animal suffering.
The question of predation aside, the issue we must address is this: Can any animals
whatsoever exist if it is not possible for them to suffer? Yes, you will say. Molluscs and
microorganisms are animals, and they exist even though it is not possible for them to
suffer. The point is probably correct; we have very little reason to suppose that animals
without brains are sentient. But a world without sentient creatures would not,
presumably, be the best God could do. So the question is, Can any of the so-called
“higher” animals, animals with brains, exist if it is not possible for them to suffer?
(Henceforth, when I speak of “animals,” I will mean, unless I indicate otherwise, animals
with brains—mammals, birds, reptiles—sentient animals capable of having, choosing
among, and acting on, at least simple desires.) Here is the first premise of my argument:
1) In creating the world, God did the best God could (BGC).1
What’s the difference between God doing the best God could in creating the world and
God creating the best of all possible worlds (BOAPW)? If God is omnipotent and
omniscient and did the best God could, wouldn’t God necessarily have created the
BOAPW?2 Perhaps not. The BOAPW presumably would contain no evil at all, but a
BGC world might contain evil so long as it were compensated for by something else. In
BGC, evil may exist so long as it is necessary in order for there to be a (greater) good.
For example, animal pain probably would not exist in BOAPW. But, I am arguing, it may
exist in BGC because it is the only way that human freedom can evolve. Whereas
BOAPW does not allow us to trade off evils for goods, BGC does.
BGC may be preferable to BOAPW if it can be shown that BOAPW is ambiguous. There
is reason to doubt that BOAPW is any more intelligible than the concept of the highest of
all possible numbers. We can always improve on the largest number imaginable by
doubling it, giving us all the reason we need to deny that there is a largest number
imaginable. Similarly, couldn’t we always improve on whatever world is proposed as
BOAPW by saying, well, imagine that there are two such worlds? If so, then we would
have all the reason we need to deny that there is a BOAPW. There’s another well-known
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problem. BOAPW would presumably be one in which humans (a) have the freedom to
choose between good and evil and (b) always choose to do the good. But if Alvin
Plantinga is right, (a) and (b) are contradictory.3 Assuming that an omnipotent God
cannot do what is logically impossible, God could not bring about BOAPW if it included
both (a) and (b).
Holding BGC allows us not to have to defend the troublesome thesis that God created the
best of all possible worlds. To hold BGC means to hold a theodicy in which whatever bad
things exist are necessary for the existence of other good things. On BGC, had the bad
things in question not existed, the world would have had to have been worse than it is.
What is the best God could do? God could create a world in which there are no mental
operations at all, a world consisting only of matter, motion and life, and containing rocks,
streams, viruses and microorganisms. No individuals with brains. In such a world, all
events would be brought about by God, either by God’s direct manipulations, like a
puppeteer pulling strings, or indirectly, by God setting up the original conditions so that
each event would occur in turn. Such a world might contain simple animals, even
molluscs, but they would engage only in comparatively simple movements, all of which
could be explained using a mechanical paradigm, say, for example, something like the
behaviorist’s stimulus-response language.
But God could do better than that by creating a world in which there are also individuals
who engage in at least some actions that are not constrained, that is, not brought about by
external forces. One way God could do this is by creating a world in which individuals
are capable of: having certain simple desires, forming hypotheses about how to satisfy
them, and testing the hypotheses by acting on them. In such a world, all events would not
be controlled by God; the individuals themselves would control some of their actions. To
act on a desire is not to be directed by external forces. If God caused all individuals to do
x every time they did x, or brought it about that they did x every time they did x, then it
would make little sense to say that animals are capable of acting on their desires.
Such a world might contain more complex animals—birds, mammals—that engage in
movements not explicable in terms of involuntary responses to inputs. It is not
implausible to say that these animals would be capable of having more than one thing
they might want to do at any time. These animals would be capable of wanting to do both
x and y at time t and of believing that if they did y at t that they would not be able to do x.
Suppose a coyote simultaneously wants to search for food for its offspring and to sleep. It
cannot do both. So it chooses to search rather than sleep. Or fight rather than flee, swim
rather than sun, gaze rather than wander, and so on. Then, in order to satisfy its desire to
find food for its offspring, it must decide again: to go down this canyon rather than that
one. So it chooses, and it goes this way. This manner of speaking, with its concepts of
belief, desire, and (rudimentary) choice may be anthropomorphic. But anthropomorphism
is not necessarily a weakness, and the conceptual scheme is widely used by animal
ecologists to explain animal behavior. I take this to be some evidence that we have good
reasons to explain worlds containing animals with brains in terms of desires and choices.
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But God could do better. God could create a world containing individuals who are
unconditionally free to will to act on very complex desires or not to will to act on them.
They would be free to choose to help create just institutions or not, to sacrifice some of
their interests for another’s welfare, and so on. If so, then it would follow that:
2) A BGC world must contain individuals with free will.
Now we must ask, What is the best way for God to create such a world? There are at
least two options: instantaneous creation or evolution. Arguably, an evolved BGC world
would be a better world, because more “storied:” temporally more complex and
interesting, and more of a challenge to create.
Thus:
3) A BGC world must evolve in such a way that individuals with free will emerge
through a long historical process something like that described by Darwin.
The next three premises claim that the evolution of humans requires the evolution of
beings capable of feeling pain.
4) To evolve individuals with free will, a BGC world must first contain desiring
creatures, animals capable of having, choosing among, and acting on at least simple
desires.
The argument for 4) is straightforward. Free will involves choosing among the things
we want to do based on various reasons we have for acting. To choose among the things
we want to do requires that we have more than one thing we want to do and that we have
some elementary way to choose one rather than another.
But desiring creatures do not arise spontaneously, so:
5) To evolve desiring creatures, a BGC world must first contain animals capable of
proto-reasoning about their desires.
By animals capable of proto-reasoning about their desires I mean creatures capable of
formulating multiple hypotheses of ways to satisfy desire x, of selecting from this menu
one hypothesis as the preferred means by which to try to satisfy desire x, and of
proceeding to act upon that hypothesis.4 By hypothesis formation and testing I do not
have in mind anything very intellectual. I take it that an individual’s behavior can be
explained in terms of hypothesis formation and testing even when the individual is
incapable of articulating that they are engaged in forming and testing hypotheses. A
coyote has to decide to act on one of two competing desires: (a) to attempt to feed its
offspring or (b) to sleep. The coyote may hypothesize that by searching for food first she
will be able to sleep later as well, but that if she sleeps first, prey will escape, her
offspring will starve, and she will have failed to feed them. Her hypothesis (though not of
course at this level of abstraction) is that by acting on (a) she will also have a good
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chance to act on (b), but by acting initially on (b) she will forego the opportunity to act on
(a). So she tests the hypothesis by acting on (a) rather than (b). The coyote is involved in
proto-reasoning about her desires.
6) To evolve animals capable of proto-reasoning about their desires, a BGC world must
first contain animals capable of feeling pain.
What would be required to evolve proto-reasoning in nonhuman animals from nonreasoning animals? One requirement would seem to be that structures develop in the
central nervous system and the brain necessary to support the complex mental operations
required for hypothesis formation and testing. Life requires the ability to store and use
information. Pain is a vital source of information, necessary for successful life and death
decisions.5 But how does such critical information—about which actions will insure
survival, which will cause pleasure, which will cause pain—enter the hominid if the
hominid is unable to experience pleasure and pain? To develop such brain structures and
neural pathways in the hominid, similar structures must have evolved in the hominid’s
precursors. As Holmes Rolston suggests, the capacity for moral autonomy must have
“evolved out of choicelike precedents in the protopsychologies of animal behavior.”6
But what does this have to do with pain? I think it is true that at least some of a desiring
creature’s choices are painful. Obviously, to choose to fight is to face the potential of
serious bodily harm; to choose to search for food is potentially to be lost or disoriented;
to choose to flee is potentially to be panicked, caught, and terrorized.7
But even when physical harm is not a risk of one’s choice, it seems there is always a
psychological price to be paid. Choosing to satisfy desire x means foregoing the
opportunity to satisfy desire y, and foregone opportunity at least sometimes entails
frustration. Frustration is arguably a kind of pain. In a very important sense, therefore, it
is impossible to choose among even trivial desires (lick rather than scratch) without
losing the opportunity to satisfy some other desire. An implication of 6), therefore, is that
if God wants to make a world containing animals with the capacity to choose among even
simple desires, then God must make a world in which there is (not merely the possibility
but) the actual occurrence of pain: the pain of frustration.
So complex hypothesis formation and testing and choice, achieved through evolution,
appears to be impossible without animal pain. If this is so, then it would be necessary for
God to create a world in which animals suffer if that world is going to contain individuals
with free will.
This leads to the conclusion:
7. Unless God makes a world containing animals capable of suffering, God cannot
evolve humans.
One might object that the argument just presented justifies a certain low level of
animal pain, but not the amount and severity of animal pain we see around us. As my
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colleague, Margaret Holmgren has put it, “could humans not evolve if lions were
herbivores who experience [only] the pain of frustration on a fairly regular basis?” In
response, I can only appeal to ignorance; I suspect that we do not really know how much
animal pain is out there, and how much human happiness is out there. If it turns out that
animal pain is usually of a fairly low, simple, and brief sort, and human flourishing is
usually of a fairly high, complex, and lasting sort, then maybe the calculus would end up
justifying God’s creating this world with its animal pain, assuming that animal pain is
required by the process of evolution. This is by no means an adequate answer to the
objection, and I repeat my agreement with Lynch’s point, that theists should not try to
save God by trivializing animal suffering. I mean only to suggest the direction a theist
might take in response to this problem.
Lynch claims in his final paragraph that “animals do not fit neatly into the Theistic moral
world view” and that “the moral view that takes animals very seriously seems to be at
odds with the morality of Theism.” I have provided in briefest outline an argument
suggesting otherwise. I agree with Lynch: A respectable theodicy should recognize the
pain and suffering of animals without absolving God of responsibility for it. But it may
well be that animal pain is justified on the grounds that animals could not have the
richness of life they have without the possibility of suffering. And it may well be that
God would not have done the best God could without evolving us, and the richness of life
we have, using as our precursors animals who, unfortunately, suffer.
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